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After a third party vendor breach, what should you tell affected customers and everyone else?

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By Abhishek G Sharma

Test your customer helpline during your next crisis drill with the following two hypothetical calls. In the first, a customer says, “Your email says my name was in the leaked data during the latest breach your company faced. Did it have my phone number or other personal information also?” In the second, the caller says, “Someone offered me compensation for the breach, and I shared the OTP my bank sent to me. What do I do now?”

Your customer helpdesk may be able to help answer the first caller by lunchtime. The second caller needs help now, even if their name never appears in the agency’s records. A supplier breach triggers both problems at once. Companies that prepare only a notice for affected customers leave helpdesk staff guessing the appropriate action when phishing attacks and fraud calls start coming in, which happens often during breaches.

On 19 November 2026, JPMorgan Chase announced that attackers had accessed marketing data held by third party vendors, potentially exposing some customers’ names and email addresses. The bank promised to reach out to affected customers directly. That promise creates an immediate dilemma for any company in the same position: your genuine warning email may land in a customer’s inbox on the exact same afternoon as a convincing scam.

1. What to tell customers whose data was exposed

To figure out who is at risk, start with the exact customer list you sent to the third-party vendor, for example a marketing agency for an ad campaign. Your live customer database on production servers will miss someone who closed their account last month and include a customer who signed up yesterday, so checking that would not yield the exact customer list of customers affected by the breach. Ask the third party vendor straightforward questions: which customer’s data did the intruder breach, and what detailed information of the customer is part of the breach? Once an attacker breaches any file or database, you must assume they have read everything in it, and your callers deserve a straight answer on exactly what detailed information was exposed.

A clear first warning should sound like: “Someone gained access to a file held by our third party marketing agency. The breached data contained your name and email address. It did not contain your phone number or other information. We’re investigating in detail the nature and depth of the breach affecting our customer’s data. If you receive a call offering compensation, hang up. Open our website or app for the next update at 4 pm.” Every detail in the message, including the update time, has to be something the company can keep.

At 3.45 pm in the crisis drill, have the third party vendor report a second compromised file. It contains the first caller’s phone number and the names of customers who have not received the notice. Test if your team can find the earlier enquiry and reach the caller through the channel they agreed on. The helpdesk agent can now say, “When we spoke this morning, we are aware of only one file being as part of the breach. We’ve since found your phone number in another file which is also part of the breach. If someone calls offering compensation, hang up.” Send an initial warning to the newly identified customers immediately, while keeping your 4 pm update promise to everyone else.

In many third party vendor breaches, waiting for a vendor’s forensic report to provide the full picture is often a mistake, because breached systems rarely leave a clean trail. In November 2026, Barracuda confirmed that an attacker had reached a system that stored the credentials its monitoring service used to connect to customers’ systems. Barracuda found no direct evidence that the attacker had accessed those credentials, but its logs could not rule out that possibility. It contacted customers whose credentials were potentially exposed and advised them to revoke and recreate those credentials and review activity in their connected systems from 1st November 2026. When a vendor asks for more time, the incident lead should ask what those extra hours could establish. If customers can already take a specific step to protect themselves, tell them what to do while the investigation continues.

2. What every customer needs to hear about the breach

Australian airline Qantas faced this exact dilemma in July 2025 after facing a cyber incident. Alongside emailing the specific customers whose records were exposed on a third-party platform, the airline also sent a broad alert to its wider frequent flyer base warning of scammers impersonating Qantas. It also warned publicly that scammers were impersonating the airline after receiving reports of phishing attacks. That second warning matters because criminals do not need a copy of the leaked list to run a scam; simply borrowing the airline’s name and headlines about the breach is enough to trick people and fool an anxious customer.

Send every customer a short advisory through the channels they already trust, and post that exact same guidance on your website, inside your app, and on the screens of your helpline staff. Spell out clearly how you will contact affected users and where anyone can report a suspicious message. Include one unmistakable red flag: anyone asking for an OTP or password to verify your identity, to process a refund or a claim, any pending payout, or help with a security update is an imposter. Make sure customers can check whether a call or message is genuine on their own, simply by opening your official app or calling the dedicated crisis helpline published inside the app and on your main website. Also, prepare your helpdesk for anxious customers who see your public advisory without receiving a personal notice of the breach; helpdesk staff should be able to state clearly which vendor records were part of the breach and how the company will alert the customer if their details surface in a later batch of affected records.

If a caller admits they already shared an OTP or password with an impostor, the immediate priority is telling them to contact their bank immediately through its official fraud channel. In India, anyone hit by financial cyber fraud should also call the national 1930 helpline right away. Your support team can record the impersonation attempt without asking the customer to repeat the OTP or password. Securing the customer’s bank account takes priority over checking whether their details were part of the breach.

3. What the CEO and board should do before a breach

The CEO should give one executive clear responsibility for the customer response during a breach, with a deputy authorised to act out of hours. Agree in advance who can approve both the private notice to affected users and the public warning to everyone else, what evidence triggers each alert, and which decisions need the CEO’s approval. If your customers transact on a Sunday evening, your fraud response must be funded and staffed for a Sunday evening. Bring the third party vendor, security, marketing, legal, and customer service teams into the same crisis drill, and send a live test notice to participants through the exact communications channels your customers actually use.

Assign regulatory reporting to its own dedicated owner so it never slows down customer support. Under Indian rules, applicable organisations must report qualifying incidents to CERT-In within six hours of noticing them or learning about them. That first report only needs the facts confirmed at that moment, with fuller details following later. At the same time, legal should track sector-specific, contractual, and privacy notification duties while front-line staff focus on protecting customers.

The board should ask the CEO to bring the results of that crisis drill to the next board meeting, backed by hard timestamps. How long did it take to identify the affected customers? How soon did the first caller get updated about their phone number, and who chased down breach notices that bounced? When the second caller said they had shared an OTP or password, how quickly did they get clear fraud-protection advice? The answers show directors where management time, supplier cooperation or additional staff would make a difference.

If the exercise exposed a gap, record who will fix it and by when. At the next board meeting, the board should ask for one simple piece of proof: what happened when someone placed those same two test calls through to the helpdesk once again?

-Abhishek G Sharma is Founder of Move78 International. Drawing on more than two decades in cybersecurity, enterprise technology risk, third-party risk, and AI governance, his work centres on helping boards and executive teams strengthen operational resilience and meet regulatory obligations across ISO/IEC 42001, NIST AI RMF, and the EU AI Act.

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